Silva Rerum | 09.05.2012 The Turkish invasion of 1672 found the Commonwealth totally unready for defence. Rare military units gave in to the invading troops, while feeble strongholds surrendered to the besieging enemy. To make things worse, the state was plunged into civil war. Two sejm sessions were adjourned without reaching any decision on necessary preparations for war. Instead on focusing on military action, the royal court planned to settle accounts with “malcontents”. The inept Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, contemptuously nicknamed “a monkey” by Jan Sobieski, refused to increase the armed forces for fear that his rival would get the upper hand. He did not come to his senses even when the Kamieniec Podolski stronghold was conquered. While the king was mobilizing a levy in mass near Gołąb, the enemy troops laid siege to Lviv. With his meagre forces to counter-attack the invading army, Sobieski was doomed to fail in all military efforts to hold off the enemy from marching to the west. The situation was slightly eased when the Turkish army lead by Kaplan Pasha abandoned the siege of Lviv. Tartar forces remaining in Red Ruthenia split into smaller units and began to kill the local people and to wreak havoc. This was exactly what Sobieski was waiting for. On the pretext of the Tartars units threatening the king’s security, he set off from Krasnystaw on 5 October 1672 on his famous military expedition. The hetman commanded some 3 thousand battle-hardened soldiers in confronting 15–20 thousand Tartar warriors. His forces were composed only of cavalry, more specifically a Polish winged cavalry of Hussars, light companies and a peasant dragoon which, if needed, could be used as infantry. The Polish commander realized that the key to his defeating the volatile Tartar units was to act quickly and decisively. Consequently, he relinquished all units of artillery and infantry and even more so, all laagers. His forces marched as briskly as the Tartars themselves. They rode on horsebacks (with each soldier having two horses), and transported no load. The direction was determined by glowing fire kindled by the vicious enemy.
They marched in very difficult conditions, at night, along muddy tracks, across many rivers, over hills and through the woods. Frosty weather made their march even tougher. The soldiers conducted the entire campaign, “hardly ever sleeping, hardly getting undressed, lighting no fire, hardly eating a thing”, mainly swede and turnip picked from the fields they passed by.
On 6 October the first two Tartar units were defeated near Narol. The chase reported that Girey’s main forces were leaving behind some spoils of war and hastily withdrawing in the direction of Nemyriv [Niemirów]. The hetman followed up this advantage. A unit commanded by Lieutenant Linkowicz engaged in a skirmish with Tartar troops near Radrużyn, with Sobieski giving the final blow. The attack and the ensuing long chase crowned the victorious battle. Smaller Tartar units were crushed on the way forward and a few thousand captives liberated.
On 9 October Sobieski set off for Gródek where he was expecting to catch the enemy, but the information proved incorrect. Further direction of his expedition was determined by the glow of fire. The key destination was the tartar camp near Komarno, protected by nuradin Safa-Girey. The plan was simple. It assumed Stefan Bidziński attacking from the north and engaging the enemy with his unit of 1000 soldiers and the main forces of 1500 blocking the enemy’s retreat across the River Vereshitsa [Wereszyca]. The Tartar commander fell into the trap, as he led his army of 7–11 thousand warriors to a head-to-head clash with Bidziński and ordered to get the captives across the river. At this point Sobieski appeared ahead of his forces. On seeing them, the Tartars panicked and bolted. The battle ended with a chase which lasted until late at night.
The successive target was Hadji-Girey, joined now by Safa-Girey. Having found out about Sobieski’s expedition, they decided to retreat from the vicinity of Bolekhiv [Bolechów] through the Bednariv [Bednarów] woods. Their troops found this crossing surprisingly difficult, as local peasants hid in the forest clearings and defended their positions with determination. The only option left for the Tartars was to march in the direction of Kalush [Kałusz]. Hetman Sobieski was swift to react. He ordered the locals “to chop down the routes”, and moved towards the enemy through very bumpy terrain. “Prowling about valleys and brushwood”, on 14 October the Polish forces surrounded the Tartars from four sides, thus preventing their escape. Taken by surprise, the Tartar forces were defeated near Petranka, with only some managing to escape. In the vicinity of Uhryniv [Uhrynów] the Polish troops caught the escaping warriors and showed no mercy on them. In banging and slashing the Tartars, Polish soldiers were joined by peasants who swept the local woods.
The victory over the main unit of armed Tartars marked the limits of Sobieski’s soldiers and their endurance. Terribly exhausted, they were no longer fit enough to engage in fighting. Their horses were in an even more pitiful state, half of them already dead. And yet, the outcome of the swift campaign was impressive. Defeated and crushed were Tartar units which had been ravaging the Lublin region and Red Ruthenia. According to Sobieski’s own calculation, as many as 44 thousand captives were set free. No lesser was the propaganda effect. The expedition against the Tartars made Sobieski famous and helped him to gain valuable military experience. By commanding relatively small forces, he was capable of using them according to plan and need. He achieved victory thanks to his skilful planning, decisiveness and an unprecedented speed. Acting in extremely difficult terrain conditions, the hetman covered far more than 300 kilometres in 10 days (i.e. over 10 kilometres per day), constantly engaged in fighting, skirmishing and enemy chasing. The campaign itself is considered one of the most glorious episodes in the history of Polish cavalry and military activity conducted along domestic routes of communication.